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When Mayor Michael Nutter took office in January 2008, 
everything seemed to be going Philadelphia’s way. The 
regional economy was growing. City coffers were filled. 
Nutter pledged financial prudence and more tax cuts. And 
he vowed to start fixing, once and for all, the city’s biggest 
and oldest fiscal albatross—its unfunded pension obliga-
tion to city government workers, which then amounted to 
nearly $3.8 billion.
A year-and-a-half later, those heady days have given way  
to a new bleak reality. 
The worst recession since the Great Depression has envel-
oped the nation and city. Financial and housing markets 
have slowed to a crawl, and the stock market has plummet-
ed. In Philadelphia, thousands of jobs have evaporated, 
pushing unemployment beyond 9 percent this spring. The 
city’s tax revenues have dwindled. Instead of a surplus, the 
city has projected a cumulative $2.4 billion shortfall from 
2010 to 2014.
Against this backdrop, one of Philadelphia’s biggest ex-
pense items—its employee benefits—has emerged front 
and center. The amount Philadelphia spent on health care 
benefits and pension costs alone stood at $830 million, 
or 21 percent of its general fund budget in fiscal 2009. 
This is up from $590 million, or 17 percent in 2005 and 
$403 million, or 16 percent, in 1998. Under a city plan that 
needs approval from the state legislature, pension costs are 
projected to decline over the next two years—before rising 
dramatically. By 2013, the bill for pensions and health care 
combined is projected to approach $1.1 billion, or 26 per-
cent of general fund spending. And that estimate is based 
on the assumption that the city’s total health care expenses 
will stay about where they are now. 
These rising costs, and concerns about them, are not 
new or unique to Philadelphia; cities across the nation are 
worried that the costs, as they grow, will limit the ability of 
local governments to perform core functions. But this long-
simmering problem is the focus of public attention now in 
a way that it has not been before.
In Philadelphia, the average city retiree’s pension check is 
roughly in line with that in other major cities. But the city’s 
pension fund itself is deeper in the hole than many public 
pension funds—due largely to past underpayments by the 
city—and may be beyond the city’s ability to fix without 
dramatic changes. The stocks, bonds and other invest-
ments held by the city Board of Pensions and Retirement, 
which have generated about half of each retiree’s pension 
check, nose-dived last year on Wall Street like the invest-
ments of many other funds. As of March 31, the market 
value of the fund’s holdings had shrunk by 30 percent—
from $4.66 billion to $3.26 billion—over 12 months.1 In ear-
ly June, city officials estimated that the pension fund had 
less than 50 percent of the assets it needed to pay retirees 
over the long run, its lowest level since 1996.
In Harrisburg, legislators are considering two pension re-
structuring proposals, one from the city and the other from 
state pension regulators that would cover Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh, which is in worse shape, and other plans across 
the state. City officials are seeking permission to withhold 
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city’s employee benefits crisis is not quiet anymore. In a 
report called Philadelphia’s Quiet Crisis: The Rising Cost 
of Employee Benefits, released in January 2008, The Pew 
Charitable Trusts and the Economy League of Greater 
Philadelphia set out to shine a light on the problem.3 The 
report documented some of the main challenges confront-
ing Philadelphia’s benefits system in relation to nine other 
cities—Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Denver, De-
troit, Phoenix, Pittsburgh and San Francisco—and gathered 
more than a dozen expert recommendations. Today, city, 
union and state officials are giving the situation all the at-
tention it deserves, and then some. 
To help inform the public discussion, the Philadelphia  
Research Initiative, with assistance from the Pew Center 
on the States, sought to update the situation regarding 
pension and health-care conditions in Philadelphia and 
the comparison cities, based on interviews with officials 
as well as the latest available documents. We reviewed 
policy changes and proposals that have arisen regarding 
Philadelphia over the past year and a half. We interviewed 
two dozen experts on employee benefits from across the 
spectrum. Three of the four major unions that represent 
Philadelphia city workers provided varying amounts of 
information. They are the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 
5; the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 22; 
and District Council 47 of the American Federation of 
State County and Municipal Employees, which represents 
white-collar workers. District Council 33, which represents 
blue-collar workers, did not respond to repeated requests 
for information.
part of their annual required payment into the already-
depleted fund and use the money to bridge what officials 
hope will be short-term, recession-driven budget deficits. 
This, in turn, will result in total pension-related payments 
by the general fund ballooning past $700 million a year in 
fiscal 2013 and 2014. 
The little-noticed state proposal would take a different tack 
and is more radical: It would impose a partial but perma-
nent takeover of distressed systems across the state and 
freeze all benefits at whatever levels exist at the time of the 
takeover. 
On employee health care, city costs have been a sizeable 
part of total employee compensation—a projected 12.8 
percent of total compensation this year. Philadelphia is dif-
ferent from other cities in that it does not administer health 
care benefits for most of its unionized employees. Rather, 
the city hands over a negotiated, per-employee amount 
of money to the unions’ four legally-independent health 
and welfare trusts funds, in which it has a minority voice 
in management. Unlike their counterparts in many cities, 
most of Philadelphia’s unionized workers are not required 
to contribute directly to the payment of their health care 
premiums. There is an area in which Philadelphia’s city 
workers get less than their peers elsewhere: They get only 
five years of retiree health care coverage, instead of the 
lifetime retiree benefits in many other cities.
Both health care and retirement compensation should be 
seen in the context of total compensation—wages and 
overtime, plus health care, pension and other benefits. On 
that score, Philadelphia appears roughly in line with other 
local and state governments nationwide, although the slice 
of total compensation it devotes to health care is bigger 
than average. This picture, drawn from a comparison of city 
figures with national survey data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau, should be taken with 
caution due to differences in living costs and salary scales, 
among other factors, from place to place.
Pension and health benefits are central to the contract re-
newal talks between the city and its four municipal unions, 
which represent 89 percent of city workers. City officials 
have said they are seeking $25 million a year in savings 
through reduced benefits and higher contributions, among 
other things, and they have indicated that service cuts and 
layoffs may be necessary absent those savings.2 
Philadelphia’s benefits system, particularly its pension fund, 
appears to be at a crossroads. One thing is certain: the 
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Key FiNdiNgs
•	 As	part	of	the	same	restructuring	plan,	the	city,	
if it gets approval from Harrisburg, would make 
actuarial changes to improve its pension projections 
and planning. One change would lower the 
assumed rate of return on investments—including 
dividends, interest and change in market value—
from the current 8.75 percent, which many experts 
consider too high, to 8.25 percent. A higher target 
eases city budget planning by presuming higher 
revenues down the road, but it also causes pension 
boards to underestimate eventual liabilities and 
set aside smaller contributions to cover them. The 
city also would stretch out payments aimed at 
eliminating its unfunded liability over 30 years;  
its current liabilities have an average of 20 years  
left to run.
Health Care Benefits
•	 Philadelphia’s	spending	on	health	care	benefits	in	
fiscal 2009 (which ends this June) declined 12.4 
percent from an abnormally costly 2008. Health 
care expenditures were 11 percent higher than two 
years ago and 45 percent higher than five years 
ago—a rise faster than city spending as a whole 
but comparable to long-term national trends.8 
Per-employee costs stayed constant last year for 
members of the two non-uniformed unions. Costs 
came down for police officers and firefighters; those 
costs had been abnormally high during the previous 
year as the result of one-time payments to settle 
arbitration disputes. The health plans run directly 
by the city were costlier this year than two of the 
union-affiliated plans. 
•	 Health	care	benefits	remain	one	of	the	city’s	 
single biggest expenditures. Health care accounted 
for 12.8 percent of total compensation for active 
employees in fiscal 2009.9 By comparison,  
state and local governments across the country 
spent an average of 10.8 percent of total com–
pensation on health care last year. Last year, 
Philadelphia devoted 7.5 percent of its general  
fund expenditures to health care for active 
employees and 1.9 percent for retiree health  
care benefits.10
Pension Benefits
•	 On the fundamental indicator of the pension fund’s 
condition—the level of assets it needs to pay 
retirees—Philadelphia’s main municipal pension 
fund sank from 55 percent in July 2008 to below 
50 percent this June.4 Blame the bear market on 
Wall Street, which pushed the severely-depleted 
fund further into the red. But even before the 
plunge, Philadelphia’s fund was in worse shape 
than those of most state and local governments 
and all of the nine comparison cities except Atlanta 
and Pittsburgh, thanks largely to the failure of city 
officials in past decades to make the necessary 
contributions. In 2006, Philadelphia was ranked the 
fifth-worst funded local plan among 84 systems 
studied by pension experts at Boston College.5 
•	 The	contributions	by	Philadelphia’s	workers,	which	
are set by contract, were lower in percentage terms 
than those of their peers in most but not all of the 
comparison cities. The majority of Philadelphia’s 
police and firefighters put 5 percent of their pay 
into the pension fund. The bulk of non-uniformed 
municipal employees last year paid 1.85 percent. 
At the same time, the average size of Philadelphia’s 
pension checks appeared to be roughly in line with 
those of other major cities in the comparison group. 
Average pensions in 2007 ranged from $18,784 for 
most retired non-uniformed workers to $27,632 for 
most retired firefighters, far below Chicago’s range 
of $27,960 to $52,446 but slightly above Detroit’s 
range of $17,231 to $27,218.6 Bigger retirement 
checks in some cities are sometimes the result 
of higher employee contributions and the desire 
to compensate for the fact that many municipal 
employees are not covered by Social Security.
•	 To	cope	with	a	current	budget	shortfall,	City	
Council has voted for a new schedule of payments 
(which also require Harrisburg’s approval) that 
pushes much of the city’s annual pension liabilities 
three years down the road. So instead of paying 
$479 million in total pension costs in fiscal 2010, 
which begins July 1, the city general fund would 
pay $332 million. The relief would turn to extra pain 
in 2013, when what would have been a $644 million 
total pension cost instead would become nearly 
$709 million.7 A sustained rally on the stock market 
would reduce taxpayers’ share of this obligation.
4The Philadelphia Research Initiative | www.pewtrusts.org/philaresearch
Quiet No More
Philadelphia Confronts the Cost of Employee Benefits
•	 Members	of	three	of	the	four	city	unions	have	no	
payroll deductions for health care and pay modest 
co-pays when they seek medical services. The 
fourth, AFSCME District Council 47, through its 
Health and Welfare Fund, requires employees to 
contribute to the cost of coverage on an as-needed 
basis. Enrollees in the city-administered health plans 
pay between 3.5 percent and 15 percent of the 
cost of health care premiums, which is close to the 
percentages typical for city employees elsewhere.
•	 A	distinguishing	characteristic	of	Philadelphia’s	
health-care benefit system is that labor unions’ 
health and welfare trust funds—legally-independent 
entities run by union and city trustees—administer 
the coverage with city-provided funds. In the past, 
city officials have suggested that consolidation in 
some form could reduce administrative costs and 
health-care coverage rates. But the city had not 
proposed such a move in contract talks as of mid-
June.11
•	 In	2008,	as	part	of	contract	talks,	the	city	and	
its four unions agreed to create a joint labor-
management committee to study, discuss and 
release recommendations on best practices to 
contain costs. The committee has not released  
any findings.
PeNsioN BeNeFits
The under-funding of the pension system has its roots in 
the 1970s and 1980s, when city officials fell short of pay-
ing the city’s full annual required contributions. In the late 
1980s, to help many Pennsylvania cities reduce pension 
liabilities, the state allowed Philadelphia to create a new 
pension plan for new employees that had lower benefits 
and lower contributions by employees themselves.18 By 
1998, however, the pension system was still severely under-
funded, holding just 52 percent of the assets it needed to 
meet liabilities—far below the 80 percent level considered 
healthy.19 In response in 1999, the city sold a $1.29-billion 
pension obligation bond designed to replenish the fund in 
one fell swoop, gambling that the city could make enough 
in the markets to pay back bond holders and then some. 
It has not worked so far. Market declines in 2000-2001 
reduced the city’s returns. The bond repayment is slated to 
cost the city $94 million in the coming year.20 A bull market 
on Wall Street later helped improve the fund’s asset-to-
liability ratio slightly to 55 percent by mid-2008, still worse 
than all but Pittsburgh in the comparison group. But the 
stock market collapse in the second half of 2008 drove the 
ratio back down, a blow that will fall on the city’s general 
fund.21 
An old problem gets worse
Why, at a time when millions of Americans feel their retire-
ments are less secure, is the dismal condition of the pen-
sion fund for 65,883 current and retired Philadelphia city 
government employees and their beneficiaries particularly 
important?
On one hand, the huge cost of city pensions seems likely 
to either gobble up resources needed for vital city services 
or drive up city taxes and fees for everybody—or do 
both—for decades to come.12 On the other hand, the exis-
tence of a secure pension system helps the city hire quali-
fied people and ultimately enables retired city workers to 
keep corner stores busy, neighborhoods alive and property 
values stable.13 And thousands of city employees, both ac-
tive and retired, are counting on the system to make good 
on its commitments. 
To be clear, Philadelphia’s pension problem centers on too 
little money being paid into the system to cover promised 
benefits, which are mostly in line with other cities. In fiscal 
2007, the average annual pension benefit for the majority 
of retired Philadelphia workers (those hired before 1987) 
ranged from $18,784 for municipal workers to $27,632 
for firefighters, with former elected officials receiving the 
highest average of $42,948.14 (Average pension checks are 
lower for retirees who were hired after 1987 under a less 
generous plan; these individuals made up about 4 percent 
of total retirees last year.15,16 ) The 2007 range was higher 
in Chicago, Phoenix and San Francisco, and slightly lower 
in Detroit and Pittsburgh.17 Comparison figures for elected 
officials in other cities were spotty.
ComPaRIson CITIEs
At various points in this report, Philadelphia is com-
pared to nine other cities: Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, 
Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Phoenix, Pittsburgh and San 
Francisco.
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* Certain cities calculate the funding ratio every two years.
** Ratio for 2003 and earlier do not include state-run police and fire pension plans.
*** Latest estimate for Pittsburgh as of December 21, 2008, provided by the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development.
SouRCE: Cities’ pension and budget reports, various years.
FIGURE 1
PeNsioN FuNdiNg LeveLs
A key indicator of a pension fund’s condition is how much in assets it has to cover its longterm liabilities to retirees. In other words, 
a fund that is 50 percent funded has half the assets it needs. A safe level is considered to be 80 percent. All figures represent 
locally-run pension systems for general fund employees only.
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Apart from the city’s long-term record of underfunding, the 
question of whether employees themselves are contribut-
ing enough is part of the negotiations between the city 
and its unions. Philadelphia employees last year ranked 
below their peers in most comparison cities in terms of the 
share of their own paychecks that they contribute to their 
pensions. The numbers were 5 percent or 6 percent for 
firefighters and police, and 1.85 percent or 3.75 percent for 
municipal employees—unionized or not. The lower contri-
butions are paid by individuals hired after 1987 under the 
new pension plan. Workers in most comparison cities paid 
more out of their own paychecks, notably in San Francisco 
(7 percent to 8 percent) and Chicago (8.5 percent to 9.1 
percent), though less in Denver (2.5 percent by municipal 
employees). Philadelphia residents appear amenable to 
making city workers pay more: an April 2009 poll by the 
Philadelphia Research Initiative found 53 percent of resi-
dents in favor of increased employee contributions and 36 
percent opposed.
Many factors go into determining how much workers pay 
in to pension funds and how much they get out after retire-
ment, including their wages, years of service, retirement 
age and benefit formulas set by contract negotiations, 
arbitration or law. In general, higher contribution rates 
tend to accompany more generous payouts for defined-
benefit plans. Another factor is Social Security, in which 
some cities do not participate at all (Atlanta and Chicago) 
while others participate just partially (firefighters and police 
officers are exempt in Philadelphia, Baltimore, Detroit and 
San Francisco, for instance). In such cases, both employ-
ees and cities enjoy some savings by being exempt from 
federal withholding requirements. In those cities, pension 
contributions—by both employees and government—may 
be higher, along with benefits.
How the pension fund is filled
Each year, money is added into the pension fund equal to 
the cost of benefits earned in that year by employees, plus 
an amount for amortized payments on investment losses, 
past missed payments and other operating liabilities. This 
money comes from three sources: contributions by employ-
ees, payments from the city’s general fund, and earnings 
on investments held by the pension fund.
The employee share, based on a rate set by union con-
tracts or city benefits policies, amounted to between 4 
percent and 7 percent of overall additions to the fund 
from fiscal 2005 to fiscal 2007, the last years for which such 
information is available.22
The city’s share comes in two parts. One is the “normal 
cost” to cover its share of employee yearly-accrued ben-
efits, which amounted to between 5 percent and 6 percent 
of total additions. The other is money to cover investment 
losses or previous payments that the city failed to make in 
years past. Combined, those payments from 2005 to 2007 
amounted to 34 percent to 39 percent of total additions. 
(The city’s payments to bond-holders for its 1999 pension 
obligation bond are paid and accounted for separately.) 
The share from investment earnings traditionally is the 
biggest. From 2005 to 2007, it ranged between roughly 55 
percent and 64 percent of total additions. But in the year 
ending on June 30, 2008, the investments lost money and 
made the fund smaller instead of bigger.23 When that hap-
pens, the added burden falls on the city, which can pay the 
shortfall or push it off to subsequent years, causing the bill 
and the total unfunded liability to grow ever larger. 
Under widely accepted standards set by the independent 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GAB), which 
establishes accounting practices for local governments, 
pension systems are supposed to pay all current obliga-
tions each year plus make payments to cover past shortfalls 
and interest spread out over 30 years.24 Philadelphia used 
a similar formula until 2003. But in the years since, the 
city has used a Pennsylvania formula that allows for lower 
payments to be made each year—in part by letting some 
makeup payments be spread out over 40 years.25 Last year, 
measured by the city’s previous GASB-type formula, the 
city paid 79.5 percent of its obligations, its lowest since 
2003.26 That was a greater shortfall than any comparison 
city except Chicago.27 Under Pennsylvania’s formula last 
year, the city paid 103 percent of its obligations. While the 
city is legally allowed to use the lower formula, the pay-
ments have not been enough to keep the fund from falling 
farther behind.
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about “weakened” pension funding.
This cycle—minimal city payments that fall short of liabili-
ties, thus leading to ever-bigger liabilities—is very difficult 
to break. In fiscal 2008, the city’s expenditure for pensions 
and pension bond repayments consumed 11 percent of 
general fund expenditures. That slice rose to nearly 12 
percent this year, is projected to fall to 9 percent next year, 
then leap to 17 percent by 2013 under the new payment 
plan that requires state legislative approval.30 Even without 
approval, the payments would rise in coming years, though 
at a flatter trajectory. Either way, this steadily rising obliga-
tion makes it ever harder for the city to get ahead of the 
situation on its own. 
When the system’s liability deepens, it’s not just red ink 
on a ledger. Credit-rating agencies closely watch all the 
debt and the city’s actions and may downgrade the city’s 
financial status, driving up its cost of borrowing for other 
purposes. In 2007, Philadelphia’s general-credit worthiness 
was downgraded by Fitch Ratings (to BBB+) and S&P (to 
BBB) in relation to its general-obligation bonds.28 Those 
weak ratings, in turn, contributed in preventing the Nutter 
administration this year from pursuing a pension-rescue 
plan it pondered in late 2008: a new $3 billion pension ob-
ligation bond to replenish the fund. The city could not find 
a bond-buyer willing to accept an interest rate low enough 
to make the deal worthwhile for the city.29 In June, Fitch af-
firmed its low Philadelphia rating and repeated its concern 
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* All figures include pension bond payments. Calculated using the city’s Minimum Municipal obligation Method and Assumptions as of June 2009.
** Projections as of March 2009, City of Philadelphia Five-Year Plan 2010-2014, Appendix IV.
SouRCE: City of Philadelphia Five Year Plans; revised and proposed projections from City of Philadelphia office of the Finance Director.
FIGURE 2
PHiLAdeLPHiA’s ANNuAL PeNsioN BiLL
The city has proposed a new schedule of payments into its pension fund that would delay until fiscal 2012 about $230 million 
in payments currently owed in 2010 and 2011. Legislators in Harrisburg must approve the plan. In this chart, the proposed new 
payments from the general fund are represented by the blue line (top line at year 2014). The city’s historic and current projected 
general fund payments are represented by the red line (bottom line at 2014).*
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Across the country, the stock market downturn had sharply 
reduced the values of assets held by many state govern-
ment pension funds as of June 2008, the last date for 
which numbers are available, and the plunge has worsened 
dramatically since then.36 At the same time, the recession 
has socked municipal budgets everywhere. Nearly every 
one of the comparison cities was struggling on the pen-
sion front. Baltimore proposed to strip a lucrative benefit 
from police and fire pension plans, then scrapped it in the 
face of opposition.37 Atlanta wants to refinance its deeply-
indebted fund.38 Pittsburgh last December had just 29 per-
cent of the assets it needs to pay retirees and is weighing a 
hike in employee contributions.39
Some local governments have concluded they must put 
off long-term pension remedies in order to get through 
the short-term crunch. Gov. Jon Corzine in New Jersey, for 
example, has proposed letting municipalities forego part 
of their contributions to the state pension system, a form 
of budget relief that has evoked heated backlash.40 Oth-
ers have decided that the situation offers the opportunity 
for long-term change. In New York, Gov. David Paterson, 
in exchange for scrapping proposed layoffs, got unions 
to agree to a new pension plan for future hires, one with 
higher employee contributions, a later retirement age and 
a requirement that individuals work ten years instead of 
five to qualify for benefits. The new system will apply to 
state workers and all local workers outside New York City, 
where Mayor Michael Bloomberg would like to see similar 
changes.41
This year may turn out to be when many local pension 
funds fall into critical condition and consider radical solu-
tions, assuming cities aren’t able to pour additional money 
into their funds. That’s the view of James McAneny, execu-
tive director of Pennsylvania’s Public Employee Retire-
ment Commission, which monitors more than 3,100 local 
pension plans in Pennsylvania: “The [funds] that are less 
than 50-percent funded are not going to come back. It’s a 
totally unrealistic assumption. You’d have to get a bubble 
like the one we just rode and have it last for 20 years. It just 
isn’t going to happen.”42
A new set of projections
In recent years, Philadelphia has opted to make high and 
arguably unrealistic projections of its pension fund’s invest-
ment returns, largely in order to make the city’s budgeting 
task easier. For the last four years, the Pension Board set 
an assumed annual return at 8.75 percent. Last year, that 
percentage was higher than all the comparison cities and 
higher than the 8 percent used by the largest number of 
public pension funds.31 
The problem comes when the money doesn’t material-
ize as planned. The city Pension Board calculates its 
yearly return on an annualized basis over five years, a 
practice called “smoothing” that is used by most invest-
ment funds. Over the last five years, on a smoothed basis, 
the city exceeded 8.75 percent per year until 2008. By a 
small margin, the fund outperformed several benchmarks 
including an aggregate of other pension funds over that 
same period, indicating that the fund has not been poorly 
invested.32 But actual returns each year have varied widely 
and have been negative since 2007. Gross returns—which 
include interest, dividends and changes in asset value 
but exclude expenses—were down 24 percent by March 
31 this year from a year earlier, although the decline has 
leveled out since then.33 The shrinkage of the fund due to 
losses in the market added millions of dollars to the city’s 
annual required contribution last year and will do so again 
this year. 
The 8.75 percent target also gives fund managers reason 
to take greater risks than they might otherwise take, expos-
ing the fund to greater potential losses. In the words of 
the Pension Board’s chief investment officer, Christopher 
McDonough: “You have to take risks to make a return. And 
the higher the target, the more risk.”34
Actuarial changes approved by the pension board this 
year though not yet implemented, would, among other 
things, lower the investment assumption to 8.25 percent 
and double the period in which the fund can average out 
losses or gains to 10 years from five years. These impor-
tant moves carry costs for the city. The Pension Board has 
estimated that lowering the return rate from 8.75 to the 
proposed 8.25 could force the city to make around $25 
million in additional contributions per year.35
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union-affiliated plan, about 22 percent of the workforce in 
total. 
In all of its funds, the city spent about $418 million in fiscal 
2009 on health benefits. About 80 percent of the money 
went to cover active employees and about 20 percent to 
cover retirees, who get full coverage for five years. The 
average spending per active employee was $12,594.46 
Boston spent $11,044 per active employee.47,48 Baltimore 
spent $10,002 per active employee for its highest level 
of coverage, according to city officials there. Boston and 
Baltimore both provide some form of health coverage 
throughout retirement, and they account for it separately.
City and union officials say their costs are high because the 
cost of health care coverage in Philadelphia generally is 
higher than in other regions, due to a lack of competition 
in the local health insurance market. To gauge whether 
health care costs here are higher than costs elsewhere, we 
reviewed two data sources comparing costs in various met-
ropolitan areas: the Milliman Medical Index, which looks 
at average annual medical spending for a typical family of 
four in selected areas, and the Dartmouth Atlas Project, 
At a time when fewer private employers are offering health 
insurance, and those who do are reducing coverage and 
shifting a greater portion of costs onto their employees, 
state and local governments continue to provide broad 
coverage, paying more of the costs and maintaining higher 
levels of benefits than in the private sector.43,44
Now, as cities across the country face budget pressures 
brought on by the recession, some mayors are trying to 
get labor unions to agree to lower health care costs in ex-
change for avoiding or reducing layoffs. Earlier this month, 
New York City announced a tentative agreement with its 
unions to reduce health care benefits, producing $400 mil-
lion in savings over two years and preserving, at least tem-
porarily, the jobs of thousands of employees.45 Reducing 
health care costs is a priority of the Nutter administration in 
its negotiations with the municipal unions.
Philadelphia offers health coverage to all of its full-time 
employees. Each of the city’s four unions administers 
health care benefits for its members through a legally-inde-
pendent trust fund. The city also operates its own plans for 
non-unionized employees and those who opt out of their 
HeALtH BeNeFits
Health care spending 
per person per month 
Health care spending 
per person per year
* “Flex” employees are not represented by unions and are not eligible for union health benefits. “Fair share” 
employees are represented by unions but have opted out of union health benefits. 
SouRCE: City of Philadelphia office of Human Resources. 
FIGURE 3
HeALtH Costs iN PHiLAdeLPHiA Per PersoN
These numbers represent how much the city spent per employee for health  
coverage during fiscal 2009. Retirees get full coverage for five years.
IAFF (Fire)  $1,270  $15,240   
LEHB (Police and Sheriffs)   $1,165  $13,980  
AFSCME DC 47  $976  $11,709   
AFSCME DC 33  $976  $11,709   
City-administered “flex” plan*   $994   $11,928  
City-administered “fair share” plan*  $985   $11,824   
Philadelphia   $1,050   $12,594 
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Mid-Atlantic region, state and local governments pay 92 
to 94 percent of the cost of premiums.54 Although the city 
provides no such percentages, Philadelphia’s overall share 
would appear to be above 94 percent; it pays 100 percent 
of the premiums for the majority of its workers.
Officials at the Law Enforcement Health Benefits Fund, 
which administers health coverage for the city’s police, 
maintain that they have been able to slow the rise in the 
fund’s premium rates and avoid imposing payroll deduc-
tions on their members by aggressively managing their 
claims through wellness programs, disease management 
and member education and involvement. They also have 
conducted performance audits to catch bogus claims, iden-
tify fraud and remove ineligible members from the rolls.55 
District Council 47’s Health and Welfare Fund has com-
mitted $2 million for wellness programs to improve health 
outcomes and forestall future treatment costs. Under its 
contract with Independence Blue Cross, the local’s health 
and welfare trust fund may enjoy a 2 percent decrease 
in annual premiums and other savings if it succeeds in 
increasing certain wellness measures, such as smoking ces-
sation and diabetes testing. 
The city-administered plans for non-union employees have 
taken a number of cost-cutting measures, but officials did 
not provide estimates of savings. The other two health 
care funds—the International Association of Fire Fighters’ 
fund and AFSCME District Council 33 Health and Welfare 
Fund—did not provide details of cost containment mea-
sures. 
Other cities negotiate with their unions over what type 
of health care the city will provide and administer. But 
Philadelphia negotiates a flat dollar amount per employee 
and then turns it over to the employee’s union health and 
welfare funds. And the funds provide the coverage. In 
2009, the per-employee per month rates for both District 
Council 33 and 47 remained the same as the previous year 
at $975.76 ($11,709 per year) and slightly below the costs 
of the city-run plans. The monthly rates for police de-
creased from $1,303 ($15,636 per year) to $1,165 ($13,980 
per year). Rates for firefighters fell from $1,444 ($17,328 
per year) to $1,270 ($15,240 per year). Both rates are set 
through arbitration.
It is not clear whether or how much this structure increases 
costs. According to latest filings with the Internal Rev-
enue Service, administrative costs were 1.4 percent for 
the police fund, 1.8 percent for the firefighters’ fund, 2.8 
percent for the white-collar union (District Council 47), and 
which looks at Medicare spending in a broader range of 
regions. These two indicators show that health care is more 
expensive in Philadelphia than in the nation as a whole but 
costs about the same as in some other East Coast cities. 
Costs in Baltimore are almost identical to Philadelphia, 
according to the Dartmouth study,49 while health care costs 
in Boston are about 5 percent higher according to Milliman 
and about 2 percent lower according to Dartmouth.50
There are several significant differences between Phila-
delphia’s system and those of other cities. One is the low 
level of employee contributions toward the cost of care. 
Employees in three of Philadelphia’s health plans have the 
entire cost of their health premiums paid for by the city 
through their union-affiliated health plans. Of the union-
affiliated health plans, only District Council 47’s health and 
welfare fund imposes as-needed payroll deductions on 
its members who opt for its highest level of coverage.51 
Members who select Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) 
coverage—which allows individuals to choose among a 
large number of doctors and hospitals—contribute $45.61 
per month for single coverage and $129.09 for family 
coverage. The plans administered by the union funds also 
tend to have relatively low co-pays. Police officers and 
firefighters pay as little as $5 for office visits and $1 for ge-
neric drugs; officials from the firefighters’ fund say that the 
low co-pays save money for the fund by keeping members 
healthy, encouraging them to stay on their medication and 
to visit their primary care doctors.52 Enrollees in the District 
Council 47 plan pay $15 for office visits and $5 for generic 
drugs. Those enrolled in the city-run plans pay $20 for of-
fice visits and $10 for generic drugs.53
The plans administered directly by the city follow an  
approach more in line with the one many cities use for all 
of their employees—requiring workers to contribute at 
differing levels depending on their choice of coverage. 
In the city-run plan, participants choosing Health Mainte-
nance Organization (HMO) coverage contribute $14.47 per 
month for individuals and $42.10 per month for families; 
for more costly PPO coverage, the monthly payroll deduc-
tions are $90.07 for individuals and $260.78 for families.  
Many cities require employee contributions ranging from 
10 to 20 percent toward premiums. On average, Boston 
covers 84 percent of the cost of health care; its employees 
cover the remaining 16 percent. Baltimore pays for 90 
percent of HMO and 80 percent of PPO coverage. San 
Francisco covers 88 percent, and Denver and Phoenix 
cover 80 percent. On average, local governments contrib-
ute 91 percent of the cost of health insurance coverage for 
single coverage and 73 percent for family coverage. In the 
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2.9 percent for the blue-collar workers (District Council 
33).56,57,58,59 The city has not provided similar figures for 
the administrative costs of the health care programs that 
it manages. 
In the past, the city has proposed consolidating the 
health funds as a way to contain administrative costs. This 
option has not been on the table in the current negotia-
tions. Proponents of consolidation also have argued that 
consolidation would allow the city to pool its purchasing 
power. Three of the four union-affiliated plans already 
benefit from joint purchasing by participating in the 
Delaware Valley Health Care Coalition, an association 
of union-benefit funds that negotiates prescription drug 
discounts. In 2008, the city and the unions created a Joint 
Labor-Management Healthcare Evaluation Committee 
with representatives from the city and each of the union-
administered funds to “explore ways to maximize the 
quality and competitiveness of benefits at an affordable 
price” and examine “best practices.”60 The committee 
has not released any findings.
In April, the Philadelphia Research Initiative asked Phila-
delphians whether city workers should pay more for their 
health benefits. Fifty-two percent of those questioned  
said “no,” and 41 percent said “yes.”
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health care benefits in the past year—and the amount they 
will owe to current workers when they retire, less the value 
of assets set aside to pay for these costs. 
The effect of these new standards can already be seen. 
Some cities, including Denver and Phoenix, have set aside 
substantial funds or revamped their benefits to reduce their 
future liabilities, while others, Philadelphia included, have 
not begun to pay down this obligation.62,63 Philadelphia 
spent $75.8 million on retiree health care in 2008, which 
amounts to 1 percent of its total operating budget expen-
ditures, and it faces a long-term liability of $1.1 billion.64 
Baltimore has a long-term liability of over $2 billion, Boston 
$3.1 billion.65
Although behind in funding its future liability, Philadelphia 
faces smaller total costs for retiree health care than many 
other cities because it offers only five years of retiree health 
care as opposed to the lifetime coverage offered else-
where. The city includes its year-to-year retiree health care 
spending in its five-year budget plan. 
In addition to pensions, many public-sector employees 
earn post-retirement health care benefits during their years 
of service. In some cities, these benefits, known as other 
post-employments benefits (OPEB), take the form of a 
flat yearly contribution toward the cost of post-retirement 
health care premiums, while in other cities, employees can 
expect full family coverage for the rest of their lives. Phila-
delphia offers its employees five years of post-retirement 
health care coverage; they get the same level of coverage, 
at the same cost to the city, as active employees. The city 
has proposed reducing this benefit to three years, while  
at least one municipal union has proposed increasing it to 
six years.
Until recently, cities paid for these benefits on a year-to-
year basis without fully accounting for future obligations. In 
June 2004, the GASB announced new standards to capture 
the full cost of retiree health care.61 The new reporting re-
quirements took effect as cities prepared their 2008 finan-
cial statements and required them to list both their “pay as 
you go” cost —the amount they paid to current retirees for 
retiree HeALtH BeNeFits
SouRCE: City of Philadelphia five-year plans.
FIGURE 4
totAL HeALtH Costs
Philadelphia’s spending on health care for employees and re-
tirees had been rising steadily until last year, when it declined 
due to reductions in payments to the health and welfare funds 
covering police officers and firefighters. 
FIsCal yEaR
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Quiet no more, the crisis in Philadelphia’s employee ben-
efits system has generated a raft of proposed changes in 
the past year, particularly regarding the pensions system. 
In June, the city and unions were engaged in negotiations 
over health care and pension costs, with the recession-
wracked government saying it needed concessions to 
avoid layoffs. 
On the pension front, the Nutter administration has  
proposed increased contributions by employees. It also  
has proposed a new, hybrid pension plan for future hires 
that would have a defined-contribution element, like a 
401(k).66 In addition, city negotiators are looking for savings 
in health care. Union officials have said they have no inter-
est in concessions.
Aside from what is happening in negotiations, the city has 
proposed withholding roughly $230 million in required 
pension contributions from all of city government in 2010 
and 2011. Without that money to invest, the pension 
fund could see its funding ratio fall as low as 41 percent 
until the city starts paying the money back in 2012, with 
8.25 percent interest a year, totaling about $65 million 
in interest payments just on the deferred amount over 
five years.67 By the middle of 2014, after two years in 
which required general fund payments would exceed 
$700 million annually (including payments on the pension 
obligation bonds), the money would be fully restored and 
the pension funding ratio would rise to a projected 45 
percent—still below current levels.
Beyond that, the Nutter administration’s deferral plan calls 
for the city to double the “smoothing” period—from five 
tHe roAd AHeAd
years to ten—it has used to balance gains and losses in 
the market. This would spread out losses and reduce the 
shortfall in bad years. Few cities extend their outlook so 
long, although many funds have been considering a longer 
period.68 The city also proposes consolidating all of its past 
pension liabilities—which on average have 20 years left to 
pay off—under a single, new 30-year payback schedule. 
This would lower the annual payments at the expense of 
longer debt time and higher cumulative interest.
In addition, the city’s plan is competing with a new plan 
from the state itself. In early June, the state Public Em-
ployee Retirement Commission, the body that monitors 
pensions across the state, proposed taking over roughly 
75 severely distressed pension plans, including those of 
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. The state would manage the 
investment portfolios, administer the benefits and bill the 
cities for their contributions, presumably on a strict leash. 
In return, the state would temporarily reduce the amount 
the city would have to pay each year, with the reduction 
phasing out over a number of years.69 Pensions would be 
removed from collective bargaining, meaning employ-
ees would lose their ability to bargain for better benefits 
and the city could not demand givebacks or underpay its 
contribution. Future hires in the city would automatically 
go into a new, separate, state-run municipal pension, with 
benefit levels set by state officials.
The outcome of all of these proposals and negotiations 
will be pivotal for the city’s fiscal future, for the workers and 
retirees who rely on these benefits and for the taxpayers 
who foot the bill.
Invaluable assistance in producing this report was provided by the Pew Center on the States. It is currently preparing 
a report, due in the fall, on retiree benefit systems in each state’s largest city plus 10 additional large cities—60 cities in 
total. Its report will examine all state- and locally-run pension funds and other post-employment benefits plans that cover 
public employees in those cities. Quiet No More only looked at locally-run plans for general fund employees in municipal, 
police and fire services.
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gLossAry
(Definitions taken from Philadelphia’s Quiet Crisis: The Rising Cost of Employee Benefits)
Amortization Period – The span of time set to fully pay 
for actuarial accrued liabilities. To adhere to generally 
accepted accounting principles, governments must use 
a period of 30 years or less to calculate their net pension 
or other post-employment benefits obligation and their 
expense on an annual basis. 
Annual required Contribution (ArC) – The amount of 
money that actuaries calculate the employer needs to con-
tribute to the plan during the current year for benefits to 
be fully funded by the end of the amortization period. (This 
calculation assumes the employer will continue contribut-
ing the ARC on a consistent basis.) The ARC is made up of 
“normal cost” – the cost of benefits earned by employees 
in the current year – and an additional amount for other 
costs unpaid or accumulated in the past.
Assets – The amount of money that a pension fund has 
on hand to fund benefits. The assets (also known as plan 
assets) build up over time, generally from three sources: 
employee contributions, employer contributions and 
investment returns. Plan assets generally are expended to 
pay pension benefits when due, refund contributions of 
members who leave the plan before qualifying for benefits 
and cover the plan’s administrative expenses. 
Assumptions – Estimates made by actuaries about the 
future behavior of various economic and demographic fac-
tors that will impact the amount of pension benefits owed 
over time, as well as assets to cover them. These estimates 
of factors such as investment returns, inflation rates and re-
tiree life spans, are used by actuaries to calculate the ARC.
defined Benefit Plan – A plan that promises its recipients 
a set level of benefits, generally for life. In the case of 
pension benefits, it is based on a “defining” formula that 
usually includes the number of years served and an em-
ployee’s salary multiplied by a preset figure (e.g., 30 years 
x $40,000 x 1.75 percent). In the case of retiree health, the 
promised benefit is typically the payment of a portion of 
(or the entire) medical insurance premium. However, it can 
also be based on a defined formula much like a pension. In 
this case, a certain monthly income is promised that must 
be used for health expenses.
defined Contribution Plan – A plan to which the employ-
er, and often the employee, contributes a defined amount 
(e.g., 8 percent of salary) to an individual account in the 
employee’s name while the employee is in active service, 
but which does not guarantee any set benefit. The amount 
available for retirement is based solely on the amount of 
money that has been saved, along with investment income 
credited to the employee’s account. When these funds are 
used up by the retiree, the benefit is exhausted. 
Minimum Municipal obligation (MMo) – Act 205, the 
Pennsylvania law which sets standards to qualify for state 
pension assistance, allows cities to use a longer (40-year) 
amortization period to calculate its pension payments and 
to reduce obligations by other amounts.
Normal Cost – The cost of benefits earned by employees 
in any given year. 
other Post-employment Benefits (oPeB) – Benefits 
other than pensions that an employer provides to former 
employees as a deferred form of compensation for their 
services. OPEB is defined by the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board as including (1) post-employment health 
care benefits and (2) other types of post-employment 
benefits—for example, life insurance— if provided sepa-
rately from a pension plan. 
smoothing – To counter the natural volatility of the stock 
market, the vast majority of states do not measure the 
funded status of pension benefits using the current market 
values of plan assets. Instead, most determine an actuarial 
value of plan assets by averaging out the effects of annual 
increases or annual decreases in market values over several 
years (generally four or five). The effect of this approach is 
to mute the immediate impact during a severe market drop 
or spike in growth and to spread it out over time.
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INTERV IEWS AND SOURCES 
We are grateful to all of the individuals who provided time and information about pension, 
health care, and other post-employment benefits costs.  They are:  Janet Anderson, City of 
Detroit; Brian J. Albert, Deputy Human Resources Director, City of Philadelphia; Keith 
Brainard, Research Director, the National Association of State Retirement Administrators; 
Heather Britton, Human Resource Supervisor, Career Service Authority, City and County of 
Denver; Jack Burke, Principal, Consulting Actuary, Milliman, Inc.;  Alan Butkovitz, Con-
troller, City of Philadelphia; Joseph Esuchanko, Actuary and President, Actuarial Service 
Company P.C.; Steven Foresti, Analyst, Wilshire Consulting; Lynda Fraley, Office of Budget 
Management, City of Boston; Ryan Francis, Director of Communications, National Confer-
ence on Public Employee Retirement Systems; Paul Fronstin, Senior Research Associate, 
Employee Benefit Research Institute; Cathy Gleason, Budget & Research Director, City of 
Phoenix; Rich Harris, Denver Employees Retirement Plan; Karl Johnson, Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board; Olga Johnson, City of Detroit; Kenneth A. Kent, Consulting 
Actuary, Cheiron Inc.; James Kidwell, Philadelphia Board of Pensions and Retirement; An-
drew Kleine, Budget Director, City of Baltimore; Mary Kyle, Deputy Personnel Director, City 
of Phoenix; Susan Mangiero, President and Consultant, Pensiongovernance.com; Robert 
McAllister, Administrator, AFSCME District Council 47’s Health and Welfare Fund; James 
L. McAneny, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Public Employees Retirement Commission; 
Uri Monson, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority; 
Marcelle Newman, Senior Budget Analyst, City Council, City of Pittsburgh; Dennis Nor-
wood, Benefits Administrator, City of Philadelphia; Lynda Orfanelli, Civil Service Commis-
sioner, City of Philadelphia; Anthony Pokora, Finance Department, City of Pittsburgh; Steve 
Ponder, Classification and Compensation Manager, Department of Human Resources, City 
of San Francisco; Louise F. Pongracz, Willig, Williams & Davidson; Fred Reddig, Executive 
Director, Center for Local Services, Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic 
Development; Joseph Saburn, Shareholder, Greenberg Traurig, LLP; Joseph Settefrati, 
Department of Human Resources, City of Philadelphia; Ron Stagliano, Pension Representa-
tive, Fraternal Order of Police Local 22; Bill Urbanic, Budget Director, City Council, City of 
Pittsburgh; Meredith Weenick, Associate Director, Office of Administration and Finance, City 
of Boston; and, Alan Zilberman, Economist, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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SPECIAL  THANKS 
We owe special thanks to Susan K. Urahn, Lori Grange, Nancy Augustine, David Draine, 
and all of our colleagues at the Pew Center on the States for their input and data-collection 
assistance. We also appreciate the insights and guidance of Katherine Barrett and Richard 
Greene, authors of Philadelphia’s Quiet Crisis: The Rising Cost of Employee Benefits. Our re-
port was greatly improved by the comments and critiques of Beth Almeida, Director, National 
Institute on Retirement Security; Michael Nadol, Managing Director, The PFM Group, LLC; 
Katherine Barrett and Richard Green; and Olivia S. Mitchell, Director, Boettner Center for 
Pensions and Retirement Security at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.  And 
we wish to thank the following individuals who were particularly helpful in answering our 
questions: Albert D’Attilio, Director of Human Resources, City of Philadelphia; Rob Dubow, 
Finance Director, City of Philadelphia; Maia Jachimowicz, Assistant Finance Director, City 
of Philadelphia; Celia O’Leary, Deputy Personnel Director, City of Philadelphia; Christo-
pher McDonough, Chief Investment Officer, Philadelphia Board of Pensions and Retirement; 
and, Cathy Scott, President, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employ-
ees District Council 47.
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The Pew Charitable Trusts is driven by the power of knowledge to solve today’s most challeng-
ing problems. Pew applies a rigorous, analytical approach to improve public policy, inform the 
public and stimulate civic life.
The Philadelphia Research Initiative at Pew provides timely, impartial research and analysis that 
helps Philadelphia’s citizens and leaders understand and address key issues facing the city.  
The initiative conducts public opinion polling; tracks trends on a wide array of key indicators of 
the city’s vitality; produces in-depth reports with facts and analysis, often comparing Philadel-
phia to other cities; and publishes briefs that illuminate front-and-center issues.
